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The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the 
LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III 
MARC SPINDELMAN* 
I. THE SHOWER TODAY: A CLOSER LOOK1 
In important respects, the bookended versions of the shower and locker 
room scene that John Bursch sketches for the Supreme Court give and receive 
meaning from one another.2 Read together, Bursch’s audience is supposed to 
know that “[g]ender identity,” which is a “broad concept,” includes not only 
men who “identif[y] as . . . wom[e]n” and who look and dress like women, but 
also “male employee[s]” who “identif[y] as . . . wom[e]n,” but do not dress or 
look like them.3 It’s these trans women, described by Bursch as not “dress[ing] 
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Geidner, Brookes Hammock, Catharine MacKinnon, Dan Tokaji, Deb Tuerkheimer, Robin 
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the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU), 
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 1 Earlier parts of this work have been published separately as Marc Spindelman, The 
Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part I, 81 
OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 81 (2020), and Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay 
on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87 (2020) 
[hereinafter Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part II]. 
 2 For description, see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part II, supra note 1, at 97–
99. 
 3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. 
EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_4gcj.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X32-Y5GT] [hereinafter 
Harris Funeral Homes Transcript]. 
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as . . . wom[e]n, [but] look[ing] like . . . m[e]n,” who Bursch is going to be 
talking about.4 
In context, Bursch’s references to a trans woman looking like a man 
function in a way that enables a subtle allusion to the fact that Aimee Stephens 
was only “intend[ing] to have sex reassignment surgery” at the time she was 
fired.5 Bursch’s audience cannot possibly miss or fail to understand the point. 
Stated directly, Bursch’s sketches involve a trans woman who has not had “sex 
reassignment surgery” who is “showing up in the shower and the locker room” 
not “dress[ed] as a woman,” indeed, not dressed at all, but “look[ing] like a 
man.”6 “Looking like a man” in this setting carries double meaning. It’s about 
being “male” in appearance or in “look,” as well as being capable of casting a 
“male” gaze. The leading meaning helps Bursch’s normative audience, itself 
predominantly, if not exclusively, non-trans, not to mistake that this “man” 
Bursch is describing, “who identifies as a woman,” is still “a man” in an 
embodied sense—with a penis. From a pro-trans point of view, this kind of focus 
on the trans body is itself a sure sign that a very serious problem is afoot. 
A larger narrative involving this “male employee who identifies as a 
woman” who shows up naked in the shower and locker room emerges from 
situational clues that Bursch’s minimalist sketching provides. Starting with the 
“overnight shelter,” Bursch identifies a place where women who have just been 
“raped, trafficked and abused” seek sanctuary.7 The women arrive at the 
“overnight shelter” post-trauma, likely post-traumatically, with injuries 
presumably inflicted by men, but only to find themselves meeting a counselor 
described by Bursch as a “man who identifies as a woman” but who “doesn’t 
 
 4 Id. This presentation of “the bathroom scenario” only involves these trans women 
using the ladies’ shower and locker room. It does not engage the alternative prospect of them 
being forced to use the men’s shower and locker room. For some related reflections focused 
on bathrooms, see TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., PEEING IN PEACE: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
TRANSGENDER ACTIVISTS AND ALLIES 3 (2005), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/94930982-PIP-Resource-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK35-
LZSV] (“Safe bathroom access is not a luxury or a special right. Without safe access to 
public bathrooms, transgender people are denied full participation in public life. . . . For 
many transgender people, finding a safe place to use the bathroom is a daily struggle. Even 
in cities or towns that are generally considered good places to be transgender, . . . many 
transgender people are harassed, beaten and questioned by authorities in both women’s and 
men’s rooms.”); id. at 4 (“Of course, some transgender people are able to use the bathroom 
of their own choosing pre- or post-transition with relative ease. . . . For other transgender 
people this is not the case for a variety of reasons. Some people do not ‘pass’ well. . . . Others 
do not necessarily identify as male or female and are harassed in both the men’s and the 
women’s bathroom.”). 
 5 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.) (citation omitted). 
 6 Id.; Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 45. 
 7 Id. at 29. 
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dress as a woman,” but “looks like a man.”8 Within this fictional story, crossing 
the shelter’s threshold means these women will be under this “man’s” authority. 
Under the circumstances, submission to “male” authority like this might be 
painful, even traumatizing, if these women are fleeing from abuses of socially 
male power that has injured them. Worse is in store: For this person Bursch 
represents as a “man” is about to abuse “his” authority and these women when 
“he” exercises the employment discrimination rights involved in the case, 
which, according to Bursch, would afford the counselor the legal right to share 
the facilities—bathroom, shower, and locker room—with these recently injured 
women.  
If, in this narrative, it is unexceptionable that a trans counselor might wish 
to relieve herself during the workday, it is not at all apparent why she would 
want or ever need to be showering or in a locker room in a state of undress with 
her and the shelter’s clients. How this conduct, if it ever were to come to pass, 
would synch with relevant licensure rules governing interactions between 
overnight shelter counselors, when duly professionally licensed, and shelter 
clients is not, of course, discussed.9 Nor did any Justice inquire about it. In this 
story what is important—and what is mentioned—is only that this counselor is 
 
 8 Id. at 29, 45. For perspective on who perpetrates their injuries, see Brief for Military 
Spouses United as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (Aug. 23, 2019) (No. 18-107) (citing The Downtown Soup Kitchen 
D/b/a Downtown Hope Ctr. v. Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage Equal Rights 
Comm’n, No. 3:18-CV-00190-SLG, 2019 WL 3769623, at *1 (D. Alaska Aug. 9, 2019) 
(noting that “[m]ost of the women at the Hope Center shelters have escaped from sex 
trafficking or been abused or battered, primarily at the hands of men”)). Although Bursch’s 
depiction involves a trans counselor at the “overnight shelter,” nothing he tells the Supreme 
Court flags the rates of anti-trans violence and injury, particularly how regularly trans people 
are victims and survivors of rape, trafficking, and abuse. Indications are found in SANDY E. 
JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 
TRANSGENDER SURVEY 14–17, 133–34, 153–55, 176, 186, 191–93, 197–209 (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/3888-SQGT] [hereinafter 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY REPORT] (tracking 
various aspects of sex-based injuries); Anne E. Fehrenbacher, Transgender People and 
Human Trafficking: Intersectional Exclusion of Transgender Migrants and People of Color 
from Anti-Trafficking Protection in the United States, 6 J. HUM. TRAFFICKING 182, 186–91 
(2020) (discussing trans people and human trafficking); and Sarah M. Peitzmeier et al., 
Development of a Novel Tool to Assess Intimate Partner Violence Against Transgender 
Individuals, 34 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2376, 2387 (2019) (noting statistics showing 
comparative rates of intimate partner violence). See also Responding to Transgender Victims 
of Sexual Assault, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, https://www.ovc.gov/pubs/forge/ 
sexual_numbers.html [https://perma.cc/L9NN-HTTP]. 
 9 For preliminaries on pro-LGBT, including pro-trans, practices for domestic violence 
programs, see generally THE NETWORK/LA RED, OPEN MINDS OPEN DOORS: TRANSFORMING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAMS TO INCLUDE LGBTQ SURVIVORS (2011), 
https://safehousingpartnerships.org/sites/default/files/201701/Open%20Minds%20Open%2
0Doors%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQB6-M2D6] [hereinafter, THE NETWORK/LA RED, 
OPEN MINDS OPEN DOORS]. Thanks to Aaron Eckhardt for introducing me to this resource. 
104 THE SHOWER’S RETURN: PART III [Vol. 81  
there in the shower and locker room. Presumably the counselor is there as a 
matter of legal entitlement under federal antidiscrimination law. 
So there this counselor is, this person Bursch describes as a “man” who 
“identifies as a woman,” naked in the shower and locker room “look[ing] like a 
man” while the women in that space with “him,” are naked, too.10 If the 
counselor’s professional authority is coded male, as it may be, given how 
hierarchically arranged professional authority can and regularly does work, the 
central point here is that the counselor’s authority is distinctively embodied. 
This authority isn’t simply gendered male, it is also vitally sexualized that way, 
not least because of what is figured as the likeness of the counselor’s body to 
the reasonably presumably male body or bodies that sexually harmed the women 
in the shelter through acts of rape, trafficking, and maybe abuse, itself regularly, 
though not necessarily definitionally, sexualized.11 These sexually injured 
women’s bodies facing the traumatic sight of what Bursch portrays as their 
“male” counselor and “his” body in the shower and locker room makes this a 
scene of sexual injury from which the cis-women are figured as hostage-like, 
powerless to escape.12 
 
 10 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 29, 45; see also infra note 12. To 
be very clear, “naked” is not a term that Bursch uses. It is, rather, the understanding that 
emerges from the larger narrative his argument unfolds, with its account of bodies in showers 
and locker rooms.  
 11 The locution in the sentence recognizes that not everyone understands gender to be 
sexual. For that view, see, for example, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power 
(1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 46, 50 (1987) (“[G]ender 
is sexualized. . . . [T]he eroticization of dominance and submission creates gender . . . .”). 
On the relation between domestic violence and sexual violence, see Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 
8 SIGNS 635, 651 n.36 (1983) (“Battery of wives has been legally separated from marital 
rape not because assault by a man’s fist is so different from assault by a penis. Both seem 
clearly violent. I am suggesting that both are also sexual.”). 
 12 For thinking in the briefing that helps frame the scene as involving sexual injury, 
see Brief for Ryan T. Anderson as Amicus Curiae Supporting Employers at 37, Altitude 
Express, Inc. v. Zarda; and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, Nos. 17-1623, 
18-107 (Aug. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Anderson Amicus Brief] (“This privacy concern is 
particularly acute for victims of sexual assault, who testify that seeing nude male bodies can 
function as a trigger.”). Accord Brief for Defend My Privacy et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Employers at 6–8, Bostock v. Clayton Cty.; Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda; and 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 (Aug. 
21, 2019) [hereinafter Defend My Privacy Amicus Brief] (noting effects of trauma and the 
importance of “safe spaces,” before observing that “[s]urvivors report that seeing a person 
of the same sex as their assailant is a common trigger”). In a detectably escalated register, 
see Brief for Professor W. Burlette Carter as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (Aug. 22, 2019) (“And 
sometimes trans people are perpetrators. I will offer only one example although there are 
others. A group of women are suing a shelter in Fresno for making them group shower with 
a trans woman with male genitalia who, they allege, repeatedly leered at and harassed 
them.”). See generally McGee v. Poverello House, No. 1:18-cv-00768-LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 
 
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 105 
This account of the shower and locker room scene is clarified and extended 
in that “other point on the restroom scenario” Bursch offers to the Court at the 
end of his oral argument.13 In this setting, the trans woman’s “male” authority 
has nothing to do with any professionalized authority she may have, but is 
attributable strictly to how Bursch characterizes her as a “female-identified” 
“male,” who has turned up, once again, in the ladies’ shower and locker room. 
This “male” authority functions here in classic male-dominant form, just like in 
the “overnight shelter’s” shower and locker room scene: “He” is situated over 
and above the women “he” finds there, women who, in this retelling, are not 
expressly identified as victims or survivors of rape, trafficking, or abuse.14 
Indeed, in producing this rendering of the “restroom scenario,” Bursch doesn’t 
even quite get to saying cis-women are in the shower or locker room with the 
trans woman he’s describing being there. 
The toxic logic of this moment only partially corresponds to the notions of 
sex that the public originally understood back in 1964, though sex here is in one 
sense basically binaristic: men and women are the only two sexes and everyone 
properly belongs either to one or the other, even if trans women are somehow 
figured as wishing to be on the other side of the sex divide and so in a distinctive 
sense “straddling” it. Sex is also biologistic in this scene in the sense that where 
anyone sits in relation to the sex-difference divide is finally a matter of “natural” 
morphology, and nothing else. At the same time, sex here is bound up with 
understandings of it that echo various ideologies of male dominance.15 It’s the 
person identified as the “man” in this setting who possesses full control over the 
scene. It’s the person identified as the “man” in this setting who’s sexually 
dominating the women under “his” control. It’s the person identified as the 
“man” in this setting who wills and decides what does or does not happen to 
those women. “Man” and “woman” here are both nouns as well as the effects of 
embodied relational dynamics: they are who they are because of their bodies, 
and they become who they are because of who here is doing what to whom.16 
 
5596875 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019); Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, McGee v. 
Poverello House, No. 1:18-cv-00768-LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 5596875 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
2019). Importantly, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s comments during oral argument spotlight the 
prospects of seeing this scene as a kind of prison and prison guard situation. See Harris 
Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 36 (describing Bursch’s example of the overnight 
shelter as “very powerful” and asking whether it “isn’t . . . exactly like Dothard [v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1997)]?”). 
 13 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 45. 
 14 Id. at 29, 45. 
 15 See, e,g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015) (mentioning male 
dominance in relation to the doctrine of coverture); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 
(1981) (upholding Louisiana’s “Head and Master” law); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–
1769, at 421–33 (1979) (discussing coverture, including the relation of “baron” and “feme”). 
 16 This helps explain the otherwise perhaps curious-seeming way that conjugal 
sexuality at times surfaced in the briefing in relation to notions of “sex,” where sex was both 
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These elements of male dominance inscribed on the trans female body are 
transphobic in no small part in virtue of their unmistakable and persistent 
misgenderings. They are also significantly transphobic in the related, dramatic 
sense that the scenes—which entail a moral lesson about who trans women, or 
these trans women anyway, are—portray trans women who have not had sex 
reassignment surgery as villains akin to rapists, traffickers, and abusers, if 
distinctive from other “men” who do those bad things because they are sexual-
injuring hostage-takers who, consistent with Bursch’s understanding of sex, are 
themselves hostage to their own biological sex, from which they wish to, but 
cannot ever escape.17 
Formally operating as part of the defense against the claim that anti-trans 
discrimination is sex discrimination, this transphobia is itself wholly sex-
dependent. It involves a straightforward case of “but-for” sex discrimination, 
making it a spectacular failure as a valid, non-sex-discriminatory argument 
ventured in the context of a Title VII sex discrimination proceeding.18 
Recognize that this person depicted as a “man who identifies as a woman” is a 
“woman who identifies as a woman,” and the shower and locker room scene 
collapses entirely as a problematic.19 The scene then becomes what, outside of 
its repeated representation as an inevitable scene of sexual abuse, it otherwise 
might have been imagined to be: just another uneventful day in the ladies’ 
shower and locker room where women, cis and trans, shower and change and 
go on their way. Bursch’s alternative offers a peephole into a sex-based, anti-
trans dystopian nightmare that some cis-men and cis-women especially may 
 
a description of certain types of persons and a specific type of erotic action. See, e.g., 
Anderson Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 9 (“conjugal marriage”); id. at 19–20 (“conjugal 
sexuality,” “conjugal union,” and “conjugal marital union”); id. at 20 (“one-flesh union”); 
id. at 21 (“a man and a woman’s ability to unite as one flesh”); id. at 23 (“marital sexuality”); 
id. at 24–25 (“conjugal marriage”); id. at 30 (“conjugal marriage”); id. at 32 (“conjugal 
understanding of marriage,” and “conjugal marriage”); id. at 33 (“conjugal union of husband 
and wife,” and “the capacity that a man and a woman have to unite as one flesh”); id. at 35 
(“conjugal marriage”); id. at 36 (“conjugal marriages,” and “conjugal understanding of 
marriage”). The logic of grammar like this is famously captured by Catharine A. 
MacKinnon: “Man fucks woman; subject verb object.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 541 (1982). 
 17 For a point of reflection on some of these nefarious social meanings and Title VII, 
see Robin Dembroff et al., Essay, What Taylor Swift and Beyoncé Teach Us About Sex and 
Causes, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8 (2020) (“The tangle of counterfactual thought 
experiments is not mysterious at all once we recognize that the statuses that Title VII forbids 
from being the basis of discrimination . . . consist in memberships in social categories—
categories brimming with often nefarious social meanings. It is, in fact, the purpose of 
antidiscrimination law to revise these nefarious meanings, and to protect individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of these meanings.”). 
 18 City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (“Such 
a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person 
in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”) (citation omitted). 
 19 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 29 (emphasis added); see also id. 
at 45.  
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find irresistibly and inalterably vexing, a call to arms in opposition to what is 
portrayed as trans criminality. 
Seen for what it is, the shower and locker room scene, its own normativities 
bound up with certain pornographic conventions, raises elemental questions 
about whose sexual investments it conforms to and satisfies. At the same time, 
and equally significantly, it is also deeply and conventionally sexist in its 
depictions of cis-women. These women and their bodies exist in this imaginary 
space as helpless, just like the women and their bodies recently arrived at the 
“overnight shelter” after having been raped, trafficked, and abused by men.20 
All cis-women in this setting are eggshell vulnerable in a nonnegotiable way 
insofar as they’re inevitably harmed by being in the inescapable presence of this 
trans woman, misgendered as a “man.”21 Women here are imaginary figures 
with no independent interiority or subjectivity.22 Their bodies are conjured in 
this scene as fawnlike and pawnlike, strategically and fictively placed in close 
and confined proximity to a naked trans woman in the shower or locker room. 
In this fantasy, these hapless cis-women witness the trans female body, and the 
way Bursch’s depiction works is that the witnessing—itself perhaps suggestive 
of other, more horrific sexual possibilities that are also not directly spoken        
of—is itself so awful it constitutes its own phallically oriented sexual harm: 
rape-like, trafficking-like, abuse-like. Bursch’s normatively cis audience—first 
the Supreme Court Justices, then others—is invited to make of these women 
their own marionettes, revealing them to be pure objects of individual and 
collective mental projection, serving as figures in a game in which trans rights 
and cis-women’s rights, trans desires and cis-women’s needs, are set up as 
naturally antagonistic to one another, trans women being fictionalized as cis-
women’s sexual enemies. 
The structure of this imaginary scene is, unsurprisingly, designed to turn at 
least the five conservative male Justices against the pro-trans sex discrimination 
claim before the Court, in ways that may make the representation, however 
inaccurately, seem conventionally homosocial: one man (Bursch) triangulating 
with other men (the five conservative male Justices) about what another person, 
figured by Bursch as a “man who identifies as a woman,” might do.23 The stakes 
here involve who will get and keep control over the bodies of vulnerable 
 
 20 Id. at 29. 
 21 Id. at 29–30, 45. 
 22 This perspective has a history that the Supreme Court’s wider sex equality doctrine 
responds to, and it thus reinforces the idea that the argument being advanced against trans 
sex discrimination rights is but another attempt that lines up with political and legal projects 
that, denying women’s subjectivities, agency, autonomy, and power, is against the very 
women the argument claims to protect. The point is discussed more fully below, infra text 
accompanying notes 24–27, 42. 
 23 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 29, 45. On homosociality, EVE 
KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE HOMOSOCIAL 
DESIRE (1985), remains fundamental. 
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women.24 The impulses the scene is thus suited to trigger are romantic, 
chauvinistic, and protectionist.25 It offers cis-men the chance to be the white 
knights who save these imaginary women in need of valiant men to save them 
from that other “man’s” criminal acts. Bursch is arguing, of course, that that act 
of heroism can and should come in the nick of time—in the form of an anti-trans 
ruling in the case by the U.S. Supreme Court.26 
Nor is that all. The salvific impulses associated with romantic paternalism, 
readily mobilized against trans and gay interests, are also subject to being 
satisfied by a return to now-widely-discredited chauvinistic, sex-protectionist 
logics that would counsel removing women from possible public zones of 
workplace danger altogether. Here, the sensibilities of the shower and locker 
room scene, although specifically a fantasy nightmare of trans female sex abuses 
of cis-women, converges with the logics of separate spheres ideology that long 
and broadly kept women from coming under the authority of the wrong men in 
public and private spaces, barring them unfettered access to the public world of 
work on the same basic terms as men.27  
Needless to say, a call for the reconstitution of separate spheres     
ideology—either in whole or only in part—is not a tenable argument in a case 
involving the meaning of Title VII’s sex discrimination ban, itself a nail in 
separate spheres ideology’s coffin. Unremarkably, Bursch—having generated 
this thinking about the shower and locker room scene—declines to draw out its 
logic in ways that make the point overtly, which saves Bursch from having to 
square it with the pro-cis-woman protectionist vision of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination ban that his position maintains it involves.  
Just so, the logic of separate spheres that travels with the shower and locker 
room scene remains available as a rough template for a range of interpretive 
moves that would drain Title VII’s sex discrimination ban of its present-day 
content. It could do this maximally, by making Title VII into the “joke” its 
 
 24 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 29–30, 45.  
 25 See Brief for Appellant at 20–21, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) 
(quoting Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971)) (“The pedestal upon which 
women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.”); 
see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (noting, in the context of a play to 
arguments from sex difference and separate spheres ideology, the justifications for 
legislation regarded as legitimately paternalistically protecting women from “the greed as 
well as the passion of man” “not merely [for] her own health, but [also] the well-being of the 
race”). Ruth Colker takes this “reference to the ‘well-being of the race’ . . . to refer to the 
white race.” Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
145, 155 (2017). 
 26 See Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part II, supra note 1, at 95 n.28 (“In a 
stylized way, this may go some distance toward helping to explain the way Bursch’s oral 
argument focused on the women’s shower and locker room and not on the presence of trans 
men in the men’s.”). 
 27 For discussion of separate spheres, including some sources that complicate the 
standard picture, see JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 173–76 
(7th ed. 2019). 
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House sponsors once had in mind for it to be, or more modestly, as Bursch’s 
argument indicates, by tabbing the statutory prohibition on sex discrimination 
to the “natural” or “biological” differences between the sexes in ways that might 
soon take aim at sex-neutral workplace rules that themselves deny the distinctive 
“natures” of women and men rather than affirming them.28 A “family values” 
understanding of Title VII sex discrimination—its contours, and its relation to 
a new vision of “home” and “work-life balance” elsewhere incipiently 
sketched—may thus be waiting in the wings.29 To be sure, for any of these 
changes to be viable, firmly established constitutional sex discrimination rules 
widely favoring and requiring sex-equal and sex-neutral treatment of women 
and men would have to be revisited.30 Without raising needless alarms, a 
Supreme Court decision embracing the shower and locker room scene as the 
basis for rejecting trans sex discrimination rights in Stephens’s case would not 
“plunge us straightaway” back into a new version of the old world of separate 
 
 28 “Sponsors” is used here in a non-technical sense. For details of the “Smith 
Amendment on sex,” “offered . . . in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery,” see Francis J. 
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 441–42 (1966). This 
“satire and ironic cajolery” took on a different cast and life as debate on the measure 
proceeded in the House, as generally traced, among other sources, in Robert C. Bird, More 
Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997). See also infra note 
29. 
 29 Thus, Ryan Anderson, after imagining re-imagining what home life could be, 
including for women, goes on to explain when talking about “work-life balance”: 
     This resetting of priorities requires changing the workplace to make it more 
hospitable to women. We’ll need to begin by acknowledging that men and women really 
are different, and taking those differences seriously in how we structure the workplace, 
rather than promoting a policy of sameness. . . . “Preferential treatment of women is 
justified even if one considers only the requirements of pregnancy, childbirth, and 
breastfeeding. It would certainly be reasonable to grant only female professors a 
semester of paid leave after the birth of a child. Male professors in highly unusual 
situations could petition for exceptions to this general policy.” This policy would 
respect the bodily nature of women and their unique capacity to bear life. 
     Workplace policies should also recognize that a mother is not interchangeable with 
other adults, especially when children are young. . . . A healthy society would recognize 
a mother’s preference to care for her child not only as her personal wish but as what’s 
best for her child and for society. 
RYAN T. ANDERSON, WHEN HARRY BECAME SALLY: RESPONDING TO THE TRANSGENDER 
MOVEMENT 171–72 (2018) (quoting Steven Rhoads). For the more comprehensive 
argument, see id. at 167–72. 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996) (offering an 
account of the Supreme Court’s modern sex equality doctrine and some of the “volumes of 
history” to which it responds). The possibility of revisiting constitutionsl sex discrimination 
norms is not new. See, e.g., id. at 574–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out prospects of 
traditional rational basis review of sex-based classifications consistent with pre-1970’s sex 
discrimination caselaw and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 
n.4 (1938)). 
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spheres ideology, but then it would “at least [be] a step in that wrong 
direction.”31 
Turning the sexist urgency of the shower and locker room scene around and 
onto itself like this means to throw a wrench into how it otherwise leverages 
progressive, especially feminist and pro-feminist, sensibilities as part of an 
effort to forge a conservative-liberal-progressive alliance in an anti-trans 
cause.32 In its different iterations, the scene may initially seem deeply pro-
feminist: witness all the care, concern, and solicitude lavished on the needs of 
women who have been raped, trafficked, and abused—needs that are then set in 
opposition to the actions of trans women represented as peculiar “men” who are 
criminal sexual injurers. Exposed as part of a regressive, sexist project that 
targets both trans women and cis-women, it provides no real occasion on which, 
as it implies, good, decent, right, upstanding people must identify and pick sides. 
A pro-trans, pro-cis-women, and anti-sexual violence politics is yet possible: 
People do it in different ways all the time. It’s just not available from within the 
logics of the shower and locker room scene as presented in the case.33 
 
 31 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court). 
 32 For one example, see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: Part II, supra note 1, at 
98 n.36 (noting the alliance of the Women’s Liberation Front and the Family Policy Alliance 
in the form of an amicus brief in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. ex rel Grimm, 137 
S. Ct. 1239 (2017)). A strong press-back (there are many) is in Robin Dembroff, Trans 
Women Are Victims of Misogyny, Too – And All Feminists Must Recognize This, GUARDIAN 
(May 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/19/valerie-
jackson-trans-women-misogyny-feminism [https://perma.cc/S3T5-UYFG] (taking the 
point on directly and in a more general way). The parallels to debates over women’s 
reproductive rights are noteworthy. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) 
(speculating about women’s “regret” about abortion decisions as a reason to constrain 
women’s reproductive choices), with id. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting how the 
majority opinion’s “thinking reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and 
under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited”). For reflections on 
“women-protective rationales” for restricting women’s rights in the reproductive justice 
context, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and 
the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, Lectures, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1642 
(2008) (discussing the “woman-protective rationale for restricting abortion”), and Mary 
Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life Feminism, 
28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 232–33 (2013) (engaging “the complexity [and] 
diversity of the pro-life feminist movement,” while keeping an eye on “woman-protective 
arguments, such as those endorsed in Gonzales v. Carhart”) (citation omitted). 
 33 THE NETWORK/LA RED, OPEN MINDS OPEN DOORS, supra note 9, generally 
illustrates this. So do, powerfully, from different directions, Dean Spade & Craig Willse, 
Norms and Normalization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FEMINIST THEORY 551, 557, 562, 
566 (Lisa Disch & Mary Hawkesworth eds., 2016) (variously noting the realities and impacts 
of sexual violence, including its “central[ity] to the system of racial chattel slavery,” 
discussing how “endemic” “sexual violence and intimate-partner violence remain,” within 
the context of a critical abolitionist project), and Dean Spade, Law as Tactics, 21 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 40, 63 (2011) (“[G]iven the rapid and massive racialized expansion of 
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Still, the shower and locker room scene has real pull, including the power 
to generate a sense of dysphoria. This is Justice Sonia Sotomayor during an early 
exchange with David Cole—even before Bursch’s argument, though it comes 
after the briefing for Harris Funeral Homes that includes discussion of showers 
and locker rooms. At this moment, Justice Sotomayor is directing Cole’s 
attention to the force of the bathroom scene in its conventional sense: 
Mr. Cole, let’s not avoid the difficult issue, okay? You have a transgender 
person who rightly is identifying as a woman and wants to use the women’s 
bedroom, rightly, wrongly, not a moral choice, but this is what they identify 
with. Their need is genuine. I’m accepting all of that -- . . . and they want to 
use the women’s bathroom. But there are other women who are made 
uncomfortable, and not merely uncomfortable, but who would feel intruded 
upon if someone who still had male characteristics walked into their bathroom. 
That’s why we have different bathrooms. . . . And what in the law will guide 
judges in balancing those things? That’s really what I think the question is 
about.34 
When a Supreme Court Justice, “accepting” that the “need[s]” of trans 
women are “genuine,” lets loose a reference describing “the women’s 
bathroom” as “the women’s bedroom,” it may be time to ask if it is really only 
“other women who are made uncomfortable, and not merely uncomfortable” 
but “would feel intruded upon” if someone with “male characteristics” were to 
walk in on them in “their bathroom.”35 How would this point on “the question 
[the case] is about” look, how might it be expressed, if instead of thinking about 
the women’s bathroom, the point had been made in the intensified way that 
Bursch would later make it, where the bathroom scenario is about women’s 
shower and locker rooms?36 How would these “other women” Justice 
Sotomayor is talking about feel about a trans woman with what she refers to as 
 
imprisonment in the United States and the disproportionate imprisonment and severe 
violence faced by trans people in prisons due to the fact that gender and sexual violence are 
foundational to imprisonment, demanding increased resources for criminalization is likely 
to further rather than reduce trans vulnerability to violence.”). Lori Watson, The Woman 
Question, 3 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 246 (2016), also offers a stirring analysis showing 
how these politics can move together. 
 34 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 10–11. The audio record confirms 
Justice Sotomayor’s use of “the women’s bedroom.” Oral Argument at 7:29, R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://apps.oyez.org/ 
player/#/roberts10/oral_argument_audio/24839 [https://perma.cc/9QV7-CB6D] (“the 
women’s bedroom”). 
 35 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 10–11 (emphasis added). 
 36 Id. at 11. Cole disputed this was “the question” thus: “Well, that is -- that is -- that 
is a question, Justice Sotomayor. It is not the question in this case.” Id. (emphasis added). 
To which she replied: “Mr. Cole, that’s – yes . . . -- because the -- once we decide the case 
in your favor, then that question is inevitable.” Id. Immediately after this, Justice Sotomayor 
put “locker rooms” into view. Id. at 11–12. 
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“male characteristics walk[ing] into their” shower and locker room?37 Would 
they find Bursch’s depiction of the shower and locker room scene “very 
powerful,” as Justice Sotomayor described his depiction of the “overnight 
shelter” after hearing him express it?38 Will the shower and locker room scene 
yet function for these women as a basis for favoring excluding trans women 
from certain jobs in certain workplaces?39 
Critical perspective on the shower and locker room scene is imperative if 
one is to apprehend—and, bearing witness, perhaps to seek to manage if not 
overcome—its triggering powers.40 Achieving this stance should also help 
 
 37 Id. at 10–11. 
 38 Id. at 36. As this exchange continued, Justice Sotomayor’s comments moved in 
directions that seemed to suggest that a women’s shelter that wished to deny a trans woman 
a job as a counselor might under some circumstances perhaps have a valid bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. See id. (describing Bursch’s example of the 
overnight shelter as “very powerful” and asking whether it “isn’t . . . exactly like Dothard 
[v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1997)]?”); id. (underscoring that Dothard “found that it was a 
BFOQ to make only men guard men and women only guard women” and suggesting that the 
results Bursch worried about in relation to the overnight shelter wouldn’t obtain via the subtle 
indication that: “I’m not quite sure that I understand your parade of horribles”); id. at 37 
(correcting Bursch’s position by describing the pro-trans argument in the case as being that, 
“if there is an independent reason why a man who’s transgendered [sic, it’s “why a trans 
woman”] can’t have a job that a woman has, then that reason is good enough, you don’t have 
to hire them”). For another moment earlier in the oral arguments when Justice Sotomayor 
spoke to the power of the what can happen in locker rooms, see id. at 12 (pointing to a 
situation involving “two locker rooms, men and women, girls and boys and who walks in is 
something you can’t control”). 
 39 See supra note 38. 
 40 Not that this is always or ever simple or simply a matter of rational choice or an 
exercise of agency or will. From one vantage point, see Defend My Privacy Amicus Brief, 
supra note 12, at 8–14 (recounting survivors’ experiences). For a view in which trans-
inclusive operating rules in the face of realities like these are discussed, see THE 
NETWORK/LA RED, OPEN MINDS OPEN DOORS, supra note 9, at 61–76, 83–88. See generally 
JULIE DARKE & ALLISON COPE, TRANS ALL. SOC’Y, TRANS INCLUSION POLICY MANUAL FOR 
WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS (2002), http://www.transalliancesociety.org/education/ 
documents/02womenpolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4GK-LPDZ]. For an important national 
consensus statement of anti-sexual assault and domestic violence organizations supporting 
trans inclusiveness, see National Consensus Statement of Anti-Sexual Assault and Domestic 
Violence Organizations in Support of Full and Equal Access for the Transgender 
Community, NTF (Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.4vawa.org/ntf-action-alerts-and-news/  
2018/4/12/national-consensus-statement-of-anti-sexual-assault-and-domestic-violence-
organizations-in-support-of-full-and-equal-access-for-the-transgender-community 
[https://perma.cc/ZG83-AP3J]. Different ways of conceptualizing trans exclusion from 
domestic violence shelters as a legal problem are mapped in Rishita Apsani, Are Women’s 
Spaces Transgender Spaces? Single-Sex Domestic Violence Shelters, Transgender 
Inclusion, and the Equal Protection Clause, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1689 (2018). They may 
become relevant if certain federal policies change. See, e.g., Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, View Rule, REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaView 
Rule?pubId=201904&RIN=2506-AC53 [https://perma.cc/Z7JM-AVGP] (describing 
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frame an inquiry into what it is that is making it possible for trans women in this 
imaginary setting to be set up to take heat for sexual dangers that are not of their 
own devising, but rather reflections of non-imaginary, real-world, material 
dangers that cis-men regularly pose to women, both cis and trans.41 Why is the 
solution to cis-male sexual violence stopping trans women from being who they 
are in traditionally women’s spaces?  
Approached another way, the shower and locker room scene that Bursch 
advances may have the cultural purchase it does, despite the problematic 
romantic paternalisms it involves, because of how the scene taps into deeply 
entrenched cis-male-dominant ways of organizing social and sexual life—and 
their violences.42 Modern, broadly sex-integrated, cis-female-inclusive forms of 
public life in the United States have been a norm, after all, for what, across 
history’s vast sweep, is only a brief moment in time.43 Even within this wider 
moment, trans-inclusivity, indeed trans life itself, may at first blush seem to 
some to involve a significant rupture with sex-based rules built atop traditional 
ideas of sexual difference, which widely organize social, including sexual, life, 
 
proposed new rule, RIN: 2506-AC53, allowing federally-funded homeless shelters to 
provide for trans-exclusions from “single-sex or sex-segregated” shelters under a range of 
circumstances). But see H.R. 3018, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/ 
116/bills/hr3018/BILLS-116hr3018rh.pdf (bill “[t]o prohibit the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development from implementing a proposed rule regarding requirements under 
Community Planning and Development housing programs”). For futher discussion on the 
proposed rule, see Tracy Jan, Proposed HUD Rule Would Strip Transgender Protections at 
Homeless Shelters, WASH. POST (May 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/2019/05/22/proposed-hud-rule-would-strip-transgender-protections-homeless-
shelters/ [https://perma.cc/V7RP-PPS8] (describing the “proposed new rule” as “allowing 
federally funded shelters to deny people admission on religious grounds or force transgender 
women to share bathrooms and sleeping quarters with men”).  
 41 See 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY REPORT, supra note 8, at 206, 208 (noting 54% of 
respondents experienced some form of intimate partner violence during their lifetimes, 19% 
had an intimate partner force them to engage in sexual activity, and 35% experienced some 
form of physical violence by an intimate partner); see also Peitzmeier et al., supra note 8, at 
2385–88, 2391–93. See generally TAYLOR N.T. BROWN & JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS 
INST., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMONG LGBT PEOPLE: A REVIEW 
OF EXISTING RESEARCH (2015), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
IPV-Sexual-Abuse-Among-LGBT-Nov-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/94E8-J28N] (discussing 
intimate partner violence and sexual abuse in relation to sub-groups within the LGBT 
communities). 
 42 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (“There can be no doubt that our 
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such 
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical 
effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”); see also Brief for Appellant at 21, Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (quoting Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 
(1971) (“The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer 
inspection, been revealed as a cage.”)). 
 43 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–39 (1996) (discussing some 
of this history in the context of higher education). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex 
Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978). 
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along with the social dangers that certain bodies need to be on guard against. No 
wonder “other women,” as Justice Sotomayor says, may experience aversive, 
even alarmed, mind-body reactions upon simply hearing the shower and locker 
room scene described.44 Think of this “restroom scenario,” and it is still easy, 
culturally speaking—remarkably easy as Bursch’s arguments show—to raise 
specters of trans-inflicted sexual violence against cis-women.45 The gesture is 
in fact so easy to make that an otherwise sympathetic Justice can find herself 
understandably speaking of the women’s “bedroom” when she means the 
women’s “bathroom” and characterizing the argument from the “overnight 
shelter” as “very powerful.”46  
Much as anything else, these positions reflect a cultural spirit: The ladies’ 
bathroom, shower, and locker room are bedrooms in this culturally-associative 
sense.47 At long last, after tremendous, heroic work, concerns about victims and 
survivors of sexual and/or domestic abuse are “very powerful,” too.48 These 
things being so, anyone (but, being real about it, distinctively any cis-identified 
person) who dwells on the shower and locker room scene for long enough may 
still find themselves being animated toward a “rage” that can grip individuals, 
as well as “the country.”49 Justice Sotomayor was assuredly accurately reporting 
the views of many cis-women and cis-men, some inclined toward pro-trans 
positions. The feelings are thus neither purely idiosyncratic nor strictly personal, 
though, as attitudes about trans people and trans equality change, they may be 
moving in those directions.50 For the time being, they are in no small part about 
how we share a culturally and historically-specific way of being—a social 
ontology—that needs to be confronted if it is to be altered in both more sex-
equal and pro-trans ways.51 This social ontology, which the shower and locker 
room scene taps into, runs deep and is capable of surfacing at and through the 
 
 44 Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 3, at 10.  
 45 See id. at 45. 
 46 Id. at 10, 29, 36. 
 47 See id. at 10–11, 29–30, 45. 
 48 Id. at 36. 
 49 The precise language Justice Sotomayor uses is “raging.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 12, Bostock v. Clayton Cty.; and Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, Nos. 17-1618, 
17-1623 (Oct. 8, 2019) (offering that the “big issue right now raging the country is bathroom 
usage”). 
 50 A parallel here is found in Masterpiece Cakeshop, as discussed in Marc Spindelman, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 347, 390–402 (2020) (discussing 
whether the decision by Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop to make a custom-made 
wedding cake for Charlie Craig and David Mullins implicated First Amendment speech 
rights, while temporizing, hence contextualizing, the claim). 
 51 A related set of arguments is deftly delivered in Robin Dembroff, Real Talk on the 
Metaphysics of Gender, 46 PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS (Takaoka & Manne eds., forthcoming) 
(on file with author). 
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level of reason.52 Unfortunately, on close inspection, that reason pervasively still 
entails the dehumanizing and marginalizing unreason of transphobia—and 
sexism. This is why trans sex discrimination protections, nested at these 
intersections, are so necessary, but also partly why those protections may seem 
to so many to unsettle so much and to put so much on the line.53 Anti-trans 
logics are powerfully culturally resonant, a central part of what the trans-
equality project, now fully joined within the wider LGBT equality movement, 
is up against in an elementary sense.54 
Recognizing this may make it somewhat easier to apprehend how efficiently 
Bursch—via the merest of rhetorical gestures—could with so few words so 
quickly and repeatedly construct transphobic castles in the sky out of ladies’ 
showers and locker rooms as a form of what some may experience as a decisive 
argument against any—and all—trans rights. At the level of non-transphobic 
reason, it should be deeply reassuring to those whose understanding is still 
evolving in relation to trans people and trans equality that Bursch had to concoct 
his case in the realm of narrative speculation. After a generation of trans sex 
equality cases, Bursch—notably—did not tell the Supreme Court about one 
single actual instance as the basis for the shower and locker room scenes he 
depicted, though there can be no real doubt that, if he had found one, he would 
have told the Court about it instead of relying on hypotheticals that he himself 
 
 52 Compare Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Transgender Bathroom Debate and the Looming 
Title IX Crisis, NEW YORKER (May 24, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/public-bathroom-regulations-could-create-a-title-ix-crisis (“The discomfort that some 
people, some sexual-assault survivors, in particular, feel at the idea of being in rest rooms 
with people with male sex organs, whatever their gender, is not easy to brush aside as 
bigotry.”), with Chase Strangio, There Is Only a Title IX Crisis if You Believe the Existence 
of Trans People Is Up for Debate, SLATE (May 27, 2016), https://slate.com/human-
interest/2016/05/jeannie-suks-newyorker-com-article-was-sloppy-and-inaccurate.html 
[https://perma.cc/U2TH-MTML] (critiquing Suk’s thinking, but also allowing that 
“[p]erhaps Suk is correct that bigotry isn’t the sole motivation behind the recent spate of laws 
driving trans people out of public life[;] [b]ut laws need not be driven by pure bigotry in 
order to be morally and legally wrong”). For another perspective, see Meghan Murphy, There 
Is No Problem with Trans People in Bathrooms, FEMINIST CURRENT (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.feministcurrent.com/2019/10/09/there-is-no-problem-with-trans-people-in-
bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/X3RE-7L63]. 
 53 On “sex” operating as an exclusionary concept, the re-inclusion of which can bust 
the category, see Lee Edelman, Tearooms and Sympathy, or, The Epistemology of the Water 
Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 553, 564 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 
1993) (discussing homosexuality’s exclusion as something that reinforces male-female sex 
difference); id. at 568 (discussing this in the context of homosexuality, the normativity of 
which can be “so radical . . . it figures futurity imperiled, it figures history as apocalypse, by 
gesturing toward the precariousness of familial and national survival”). 
 54 There is a painful history of intra-community division here. For but one of many 
sources on the subject, see generally Mubarak Dahir, Whose Movement Is It?, THE 
ADVOCATE, May 25, 1999, at 50. See also Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein 
Above the Village of Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage, in THE TRANSGENDER 
STUDIES READER 244, 245–46 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Wittle eds., 2006). 
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made up.55 Lacking one, Bursch’s audience, prominently and specifically the 
Supreme Court, has no secure foundation for figuring an attack on a non-trans 
woman—indeed, on any woman or anyone else—by a trans woman in a shower 
or locker room as a predicate for its decision in the case. 
 
It is regularly true, as the saying goes, that it gets better. Sometimes, though, 
as with the arguments ventured in Stephens’s case, it actually gets worse before 
it gets better. 
 
 55 Not discussed at oral argument was a case mentioned in Harris Funeral Homes’s 
merits brief involving a religious shelter in Alaska that may be thought to provide a template 
for the “overnight shelter” hypothetical he raised. Brief for the Petitioner at 52–53, R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 9, 2019) (discussing the case). 
The case itself did not involve a trans counselor. See Downtown Soup Kitchen v. Anchorage, 
406 F. Supp. 3d 776, 781–84 (D. Alaska 2019). Various amicus briefs focused on this case 
as well. See, e.g., Defend My Privacy Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 11–14. Bursch himself 
returned to the case elsewhere. John Bursch, Difficult Issues Involving Human Sexuality 
Require Dialogue, Not Scorn, Misinformation, HILL (Oct. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/ 
blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/465844-difficult-issues-involving-human-sexuality-
require-dialogue [https://perma.cc/2FLA-LQYA] (“In Alaska, local officials redefined ‘sex’ 
to try and force a women’s overnight shelter to allow a man identifying as a woman to sleep 
mere feet away from women who have been raped, trafficked and abused. A federal court 
enjoined that bureaucratic effort.”). Other instances, even more vivid, also notably absent 
from Harris Funeral Homes’s briefing and Bursch’s oral argument, are found supra note 12. 
See also, e.g., Brief for National Organization for Marriage and Center for Constitutional 
Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in No. 17-1618 and Petitioners in 
Nos. 17-1623, 18-107 at 13–14, Bostock v. Clayton Cty.; Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda; 
and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 (Aug. 
22, 2019) (discussing a case from Washington state in which “a woman who had suffered 
sexual abuse as a child was fired from her job for declining to go along with the YMCA’s 
recent policy mandating that women’s locker rooms and showers be open to men,” even 
though “the policy re-awakened her old trauma”); Brief for Women’s Liberation Front as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, 14 n.22, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. 
v. EEOC, No. 18-107 (Oct. 9, 2019) (describing a case from the United Kingdom involving 
“a man who goes by [a female name], who had previously been convicted of rape, was placed 
in a women’s prison where he went on to sexually assault additional women.”).  
